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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
STANTON ROAD ASSOCIATES v. LOHREY 
ENTERPRISES: THE AMERICAN RULE 
PRECLUDES AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES IN PRIVATE-PARTY CERCLA COST 
RECOVERY ACTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Stanton Road Associates. v. Lohrey Enterprises 1 and 
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,2 the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed an issue of first impression,3 whether the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act' 
(CERCLA or the Act), a federal statute providing a mechanism 
for cleaning up the environment, authorizes private parties to 
recover attorneys' fees in claims against other parties responsi-
ble for causing the pollution as "enforcement costs." The court 
concluded that the American Rule li (Rule) precluded such a re-
1. Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993) (per Alarc6n, 
J., the other panel members were Sneed, J., and Canby, J.). 
2. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir.) (per Alarc6n, J., the 
other panel members were Sneed, J., and Canby, J.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 633 (1993). 
3. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1018. But see Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 
392 (9th Cir. 1989). In Hanna Mining the Ninth Circuit declined to award attorneys' 
fees to the state of Idaho in a claim to recover natural resources damages. The court 
stated "CERCLA does not state whether attorneys' fees may be awarded for actions for 
natural resources damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(C) and 9607(f), nor do any 
cases appear to resolve the question. We elect to make no award of attorneys' fees." [d. 
at 396. 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9692 (1993). 
5. The American Rule argues that each party bear all the costs incurred litigating 
claims. The Rule arose from public policy concerns that forcing the losing party to shoul-
der the burden of the prevailing party's litigation costs would needlessly limit access to 
courts by non-wealthy litigants, without regard to the merit of their claims. See section 
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covery based on: (a) holdings of the United States Supreme 
Court emphasizing the Rule's prominent guiding role in Ameri-
can jurisprudence,6 and (b) the absence of sufficiently explicit 
language in the statute to warrant the court's recognizing an ex-
ception to the Rule for private-party CERCLA cost recovery 
claims.' 
In Key Tronic, the Ninth Circuit found the American Rule's 
prohibition against the awarding of the prevailing party's attor-
neys' fees encompassed an award for non-litigation costs in-
curred by the plaintiff in negotiating a consent decree with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and in identifying 
other potentially responsible parties.s This component of the 
Ninth Circuit's holding differs from a recent opinion of the 
Tenth Circuit.9 
In Stanton Road, in addition to reversing the award of at-
torneys' fees, the Ninth Circuit found error in the trial court's 
requiring the defendant to establish a $1.1 million escrow ac-
count to pay the plaintiff's future cleanup costs.10 CERCLA, the 
court held, only authorized recovery of costs already incurred, 
not costs to be incurred.ll 
Unlike other courts that have addressed the issue, the 
Ninth Circuit refused to consider the legislative history of the 
Act, or weigh CERCLA's policy goals in making its determina-
tion. 12 Judge Canby issued a dissenting opinion critical of the 
majority's analysis in this regard. IS 
Courts interpreting CERCLA have disagreed bitterly on the 
recovery of attorneys' fees. 14 Prior to the Ninth Circuit's hold-
6. Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO. V. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Runyon V. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
7. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1020; Key Tronic, 984 F.2d at 1027. 
8. Key Tronic, 984 F.2d at 1027-28. 
9. FMC Corp. V. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d 842, 847-48 (10th Cir. 1993) see infra notes 
185-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's analysis. 
10. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1021. 
11. Id. In his dissent, Judge Canby criticized this portion of the majority's holding 
as counter to CERCLA's underlying remedial purpose, which, he believed, favored the 
use of such "creative solutions" absent an explicit statutory prohibition. Id. at 1025. 
12. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019. 
13. Id. at 1023. 
14. Compare Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991) 
2
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ing, only the Eighth Circuit had addressed whether attorneys' 
fees constituted recoverable response costs, reaching a conclu-
sion opposite to that of Stanton Road. 111 The Ninth Circuit criti-
cized the Eighth Circuit's analysis as "reading into the statute 
words not explicitly inserted by Congress. "16 
Since Stanton Road's publication, the First17 and Tenth18 
Circuits have issued holdings comporting with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the American Rule precludes the award of 
attorneys' fees in a cost recovery claim. By contrast, the Sixth19 
Circuit chose to adopt the Eighth Circuit's rationale and allow 
the public policy goals underlying CERCLA to guide its analysis. 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve this split in 
authority among the Circuits.20 
II. FACTS 
A. STANTON ROAD ASSOCIATES V. LOHREY ENTERPRISES 21 
Lohrey operated a dry cleaning plant in Burlingame, Cali-
fornia22 on land adjacent to property owned by Stanton Road.23 
Lohrey used the hazardous substance perchloroethylene24 (perc), 
(finding private party litigation costs recoverable) with United States v. Hardage, 750 F. 
Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (finding such costs not recoverable), aff'd, 982 F.2d 
1436 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993) and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Kop-
pers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1420, 1427 (D. Md. 1991) (finding the transference of fees inap-
propriate in a case involving corporate equals sharing CERCLA liability); see also Cook 
v. Rockwell Int'l, Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1476 (D. Colo. 1991) (granting plaintiff's 
motion to amend a cost recovery claim based exclusively on litigation expenses incurred 
for the purpose of adding "at least one cognizable response cost"). 
15. See generally General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 
1422 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil of 
California, 955 F.2d 519, 527 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 
Inc., 980 F.2d 478, 491 (8th Cir. 1992) (awarding attorneys' fees in a CERCLA contribu-
tion, as opposed to a cost recovery, claim). 
16. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1020. 
17. In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 933 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 303 (1993). 
18. FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d 842, 847 (10th Cir. 1993). 
19. Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 636 
(1993). 
20. 114 S. Ct. 633 (1993). 
21. 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993). 
22. THE RECORDER, December 14, 1993, at 3. 
23. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1016. 
24. A commonly used dry cleaning solvent with toxic properties, perchloroethylene 
(perc) is subject to CERCLA regulation by Section 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1993), 
3
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and the chemical spilled into an alley separating the two proper-
ties. Eventually, the spilled perc contaminated the Stanton 
Road property. The Associates brought an action seeking declar-
atory relief and response costs21i under CERCLA and various 
state causes of action, including trespass, negligence and 
nuisance.26 , 
Stanton Road introduced unrefuted evidence that the 
cleanup of the environmental contamination would cost a mini-
mum of $1,100,000.27 Consequently, the trial court awarded 
Stanton Road over $460,000 in CERCLA response costs, com-
bined with state law damages, and $126,000 in attorneys' fees 
incurred in pursuing the claim.2s In addition, the court ordered 
Lohrey to establish an escrow account for $1,100,000 to finance 
the cleanup of Stanton Road's property.29 
As constructed, the defendants exercised no control over the 
escrow account other than to monitor expenditures. On achiev-
ing "all relevant regulatory cleanup levels and requirements," 
any balance remaining in the fund was to be refunded to 
Lohrey.30 In response to an inquiry from the Ninth Circuit, the 
trial court stated that the escrow account was ordered under the 
authority of both CERCLA and state law.31 
which incorporates by reference chemicals regulated under a number of other federal 
environmental statutes. See infra note 93. Perc is subject to federal regulation as: (1) a 
listed hazardous waste under Section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6901-6992 (1993), (2) a toxic pollutant listed under Section 307 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1993), and (3) a hazardous air pollutant 
under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1993). Perc is also rec-
ognized as a carcinogen and subject to regulation in California under the Safe Drinking 
Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Prop 65), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 25249.5-25249.13 (West 1993), which prohibits the discharge of a listed chemical in 
sources of drinking water or the knowing and intentional exposure of a person to a listed 
chemical absent a clear and reasonable warning. 
25. See text accompanying footnotes 39 and 120, infra. 
26. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1016. 






Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss3/5
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 581 
B. KEY TRONIC CORP. V. UNITED STATES 32 
Both Key Tronic and the United States Air Force disposed 
of chemical wastes at a disposal site in Colbert, Washington.33 In 
1980, the Washington Department of Ecology discovered con-
tamination in drinking water wells surrounding Colbert and, in 
conjunction with the EPA, initiated cleanup efforts. The regula-
tory agencies also sought to recover their cleanup costs from Key 
Tronic and the Air Force.34 
Both Key Tronic and the Air Force entered consent decrees 
with the EPA.3& Key Tronic's arrangement required the pay-
ment of $4.2 million in response costs to the EPA. The Air Force 
paid $1.45 million for the cleanup of Colbert.36 
Key Tronic brought an action against the Air Force to re-
cover costs under CERCLA.37 Specific components of Key 
Tronic's claim included: (a) the right to contribution against the 
Air Force for Key Tronic's $4.2 million consent decree payment, 
and (b) $1.2 million in response costs Key Tronic incurred prior 
to its settlement with the EPA.38 Key Tronic contended that it 
had incurred five different types of response costs consisting of: 
(1) remediation costs at the site prior to the EPA's involvement; 
(2) attorneys' fees expended trying to identify other potentially 
responsible parties (PRP's); (3) attorneys' fees incurred in nego-
tiating the terms of the consent decree with the EPA; (4) attor-
neys' fees for the present action; and (5) prejudgment interest.39 
The district court dismissed Key Tronic's contribution 
claim on the ground that it was barred by the Air Force's con-
sent decree with the EPA.40 The court concluded that CERCLA 
section 122(g)(5)41 negated any right to contribution from a 
32. 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 633 (1993). 




37. Key Tronic, 984 F.2d at 1026. 
38.Id. 
39.Id. 
40. Id. at 1026-27. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) (1993) states in pertinent part: U[a) party who has re-
solved its liability to the United States under this section shall not be liable for claims 
5
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party that had resolved its liability to the United States.42 The 
court refused, however, to dismiss Key Tronic's $1.2 million re-
sponse cost claim. Such a claim, the court emphasized, arose 
from the authority of Section l07(a)(4)(B)43 and was not barred 
by the "contribution protection" derived from the EPA consent 
decree.44 Subsequent to the trial court's holding, the parties re-
solved their differences except those pertaining to Key Tronic's 
claim for attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest. The district 
court awarded both to Key Tronic and the Air Force appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit. The Air Force's appeal, however, was limited 
to the issue of whether CERCLA authorizes the recovery of at-
torneys' fees by private-party cost recovery claimants.4G 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE AMERICAN RULE 
The American Rule states that, absent explicit congres-
sional authorization, attorneys' fees are not a recoverable cost of 
for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement." 
The court may have cited the wrong authority to support its holding, however. Sec-
tion 122 was incorporated into CERCLA with the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) and applies only to de minimis settlements. It is 
difficult to conceive of a consent decree imposing a $1.45 million payment as a de 
minimis settlement. In any event, the discrepancy may be only of academic interest as 
Section 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1993), which was also incorporated into CER-
CLA with the passage of SARA, provides an identically worded protection from contri-
bution claims to parties settling with the United States, without regard to the scope of 
the controversy. 
CERCLA's contribution claim protection provisions reflect congressional recognition 
that settlements with potentially responsible parties (PRP's) are the best means of 
avoiding the needless expenditure of limited Superfund monies while ensuring a timely 
cleanup response. The immunity from contribution liability "provides the carrot to coax 
parties into settling." Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1087 
(D. N.J. 1992), appeal dismissed, 5 F.3d 51 (3d Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 
U.S.L.W. 3410 (Dec. 14, 1993). See generally Note, Deuelopments in the Law: Toxic 
Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1537 (1986); Dennis J. Byrne, Note, Jones-
Hamilton Co. u. Beazer Materials: Chemical Supplier "Arranges" for CERCLA Liabil-
ity, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 213, 227-30 (1993) (providing an historical review and 
analysis of the right to contribution CERCLA grants liable parties). 
42. Key Tronic, 984 F.2d at 1026-27. 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1993) states in pertinent part: "any person ... shall 
be liable for . . . any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person 
consistent with the national contingency plan." 
44. Key Tronic, 984 F.2d at 1027. 
45.Id. 
6
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litigation.46 The Rule stands in contrast to the English Rule 
which holds that the loser must pay the winner's attorneys' fees 
in order to make the winner whole." The American Rule 
evolved, at least in part, to counter the perceived chilling effect 
that fee shifting can have on potential plaintiffs.48 In the Rule's 
absence, a potential litigant may think twice before commencing 
an action, particularly against a governmental or large corporate 
entity.'9 The Rule, combined with contingent fee arrangements, 
grants potential plaintiffs relatively easy access to the courts.IIO 
Well-established exceptions to the Rule have arisen from 
the equitable power of courts.1I1 The "Common Fund Exception" 
applies an unjust enrichment theory to allow an award of attor-
neys' fees when litigation results in the creation of a specific 
monetary fund in which non-parties may share.1I2 Subtracting 
the fee award from the total fund and awarding the fee to the 
plaintiffs and their attorneys spreads the burden of financing 
the litigation among all who share in the fund's benefits.1I3 
The "Substantial Benefit Exception" also arose from unjust 
enrichment principles but, unlike the common fund exception, is 
applicable where non-pecuniary benefits are derived for parties 
and non-parties alike.1I4 The substantial benefit exception is 
commonly applied in shareholder derivative litigation in recogni-
tion that all shareholders benefit from the action.1I1I 
A final non-statutory exception to the American Rule may 
be recognized when a losing party "acts in bad faith, vexatiously, 
or for oppressive reasons."116 However, the fact that a plaintiff 
46. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976). 
47. See 1 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL 




51. Id. § 13.03. 
52. Id. § 13.03(1). 
53. See, e.g., Sprauge v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939). 
54. MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 47, § 13.03(2). 
55. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 390-97 (1970); Hall v. Cole, 
412 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1973) (upholding the award of attorneys' fees to a former union member 
whose action benefitted all members by establishing certain rights of free speech within 
the union). 
56. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). 
7
Byrne: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
584 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:577 
prevails on a claim, standing alone, does not establish a basis for 
imposing the "penalty assessment" of having to pay the plain-
tiff's litigation costS.1I7 
In the 1960's and 1970's, a number of important federal 
statutes expressly authorized courts to award attorneys' fees to 
prevailing parties. liS This practice reflected congressional aware-
ness that private actions facilitate a la~'s enforcement and 
thereby further the underlying federal interest. liS The practice 
became known as the "Private Attorney General Doctrine."sD 
Fee shifting provisions were incorporated into a number of 
federal environmental statutes.S1 Nevertheless, in the 1970's, 
public interest lawyers attempted to expand the scope of equita-
bly-based exceptions to the American Rule and acquire attor-
neys' fees as private attorneys general for actions enforcing envi-
ronmental statutes that did not explicitly grant an award of 
litigation costS.62 Claimants argued that as a practical matter, 
private enforcement of federal environmental laws depended on 
the availability of court-awarded fees. 6s The plaintiffs in such 
actions typically had little or no personal financial stake in the 
outcome. Moreover, the remedy sought was frequently some 
manner of injunctive relief, thereby precluding a contingent fee 
arrangement. Furthermore, proponents argued, unjust enrich-
ment principles favored such a fee shift because the community 
as a whole benefitted if the plaintiffs prevailed.s• 
In Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society,SII the United 
States Supreme Court restricted further expansion of the pri-
vate attorney general doctrine. An award of attorneys' fees, the 
57. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 183. 
58. See, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1993); the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1993). 
59. See 1 MANAsTER & SELMI, supra note 47, § 13.03(3)(b). 
60.Id. 
6!. See, e.g., the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1993); the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1993); the Marine Protection, Re-
search, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1993); the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1993); and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(d) (1993). 
62. See MANAsTER & SELMI, supra note 47, § 13.03(3)(b). 
63.Id. 
64.Id. 
65. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
8
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Court declared, must be based on explicit statutory authority.66 
Courts were not to imply the authority for such an award due to 
the fact that Congress anticipated that private actions would 
playa substantial role in enforcing a law.67 
The Court emphasized that the American Rule was "deeply 
rooted in our history and in congressional policy."68 Further-
more, the Court pointed out, rather than repudiate the Rule, 
Congress had fashioned "specific and explicit provisions for the 
allowance of attorneys' fees under selected statutes granting or 
protecting various federal rights. "69 Such a determination, the 
Court declared, was a prerogative of Congress, not the judici-
ary.70 In summary, the Court stated: 
[C]ourts are not free to fashion drastic new rules 
with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees to 
the prevailing party in federal litigation or to pick 
and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes 
under which they sue and to award fees in some 
cases but not in others, depending upon the 
court's assessment of the importance of the public 
policies involved in particular cases.71 
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF CERCLA 
Since its enactment in 1980, CERCLA has been the subject 
of considerable criticism from courts and commentators.72 
66. [d. at 269. 
67. The Court stated: 
[d. at 263. 
It is true that . . . Congress has opted to rely heavily on 
private enforcement to implement public policy and allow 
counsel fees so as to encourage private litigation .... But con-
gressional utilization of the private-attorney-general concept 
can in no sense be construed as a grant of authority to the 
Judiciary to jettison the traditional rule against nonstatutory 
allowances to the prevailing party and to award attorneys' fees 
whenever the court deems the public policy furthered by a 
particular statute important enough to warrant the award. 
68. [d. at 271. 
69. [d. at 260. 
70. "It is apparent that the circumstances under which attorneys' fees are to be 
awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for 
Congress to determine." [d. at 262. 
71. [d. at 269. 
72. See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992) ("In keep-
9
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CERCLA was enacted to address perceived inadequacies in the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery ACt'3 (RCRA), which Con-
gress conceived as a regulatory tool to ensure the proper man-
agement of hazardous waste.74 The legislation, however, failed to 
account for abandoned hazardous waste sites.71i Another defi-
ciency perceived in RCRA was the absence of a government 
funding source for addressing contaminated sites.76 RCRA relied 
exclusively on the availability of a financially responsible 
owner.77 Congressional action was spurred by 1979 estimates of 
the EPA that from 30,000 to 50,000 inactive hazardous waste 
sites existed throughout the United States, 1,000 to 2,000 of 
which were believed to present a serious risk to public health.78 
By enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to "establish a 
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and 
control the vast problems with abandoned and inactive hazard-
ous waste disposal sites."79 The Act's purpose was to ensure a 
rapid recovery of government funds expended in cleanup efforts 
and to induce persons responsible for creating contaminated 
sites to clean them up voluntarily.80 To effect this purpose, the 
ing with its notorious lack of clarity, CERCLA leads us down a convoluted path .... "); 
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988) ( .. It is 
not surprising that, as a hastily conceived and briefly debated piece of legislation, CER-
CLA failed to address many important issues .... "), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989); 
Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) ("CERCLA is 
not a paradigm of clarity or precision."); Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong World 
Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("[Ilt is debatable whether any provision 
of CERCLA is clear .... "). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992 (1993). 
74. 94th Congress Wrap-Up: Much Accomplished, Many Issues Left for the 95th 
Congress, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. 10005, 10008 (1977); see also, The Environment - The Presi-
dent's Message to the Congress, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. 50057, 50059 (1977) ("The Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, passed in 1976, gave the Environmental Protection 
Agency the authority it needs to regulate hazardous wastes and to assure the safe dispo-
sal of other residues."). 
75. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Congo 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125 (1980); see also Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liabil-
ity for Environmental Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 61-62 (1987) 
("RCRA, which is intended to control hazardous waste from 'cradle to grave,' is a more 
focused piece of legislation than CERCLA. RCRA's primary concern is with active solid 
waste facilities rather than hidden environmental contamination."). 
76. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125 (1980). 
77.Id. 
78. Id. at 6120. 
79. Id. at 6125. 
80. Id. at 6120. 
10
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legislation created a strict liability federal cause of action which 
courts have construed as applicable to both active and aban-
doned sites.81 
Under CERCLA, the President, usually acting through the 
EPA Administrator, is authorized to take necessary remedial ac-
tions at inactive hazardous waste sites that present unreasonable 
risks to public health or the environment.82 The Act grants the 
President authority to order a responsible party to take remedial 
actions, establishes a cost recovery mechanism for government 
funds expended in the effort, and provides sanctions against a 
party refusing to comply with such orders.83 
The legislation created a so-called "Superfund" to finance 
cleanup operations.84 In common parlance, CERCLA is known 
as the federal "Superfund Act" in recognition of this funding 
mechanism.811 The Superfund is financed through a combination 
of appropriations, industry taxes, and cost recovery actions.88 
CERCLA is recognized as a remedial statutory scheme ne-
cessitating a liberal construction by interpreting courts.87 The li-
ability imposed is not intended to be punitive.88 Among the 
81. See Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (emphasizing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A),s inclusion of "abandoned" within 
the statutory definition of "owner or operator"). 
82. H.R. REP. No. 1016, ~6th Congo 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6131 (1980). 
83. Id. at 6133; see also 2 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI. CALIFORNIA 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE, § 50.51(3) (Matthew Bender 1993) ("Al-
though issuance of cleanup orders under CERCLA has to date been somewhat rare, the 
penalty for disobedience of such an order is severe - a fine of up to $25,000 per day of 
violation. Furthermore, pre-enforcement judicial review of a cleanup order is generally 
prohibited by CERCLA [Section 113(h)]."). 
84. Section 101(11), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (1993). 
85. 2 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND LAND USE PRACTICE, § 50.51(1) (Matthew Bender 1993). 
86.Id. 
87. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. 805 F.2d 1074, 
1081 (1st Cir. 1986) ("CERCLA is basically a remedial statute designed by Congress to 
protect and preserve public health and the environment. We are therefore obligated to 
construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative 
purposes. "), 
88. See Jane DiRenzo Pigott & Zemeheret Bereket-Ab, Status of Indemnity Agree-
ments Under CERCLA Section IO 7 (e) , 6 TOXIC L. REP, (BNA) 1351, 1355 (1992); see 
also Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 
1537 (1986) ("The purpose of the statute is not to punish defendants but to ensure that 
waste sites are cleaned up."), 
11
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Act's most important goals are the encouragement of voluntary 
cleanup efforts or, in the alternative, the reimbursement of gov-
ernment funds expended in addressing contaminated sites.8s 
The EPA views inducing voluntary cleanup actions as its pri-
mary goal.so Courts applying CERCLA have cited two primary 
legislative purposes underlying the Act: to give governmental 
agencies the tools for prompt and effective responses to such 
problems and to force those responsible for creating the pollu-
tion to bear the costs of remedying the contamination.s1 
CERCLA was enacted as a last-minute compromise between 
three competing bills.s2 The Act includes by reference within its 
statutory definition of hazardous substance a number of chemi-
cals regulated under other federal environmental laws at the 
time of its enactment.ss Courts have applied common law doc-
89. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 88, at 1355; see also H.R. REP. No. 
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 
6132 (1980) (emphasizing that the apportionment of costs among 'responsible parties will 
result in a more rapid cleanup response and preclude a party having to spend more 
funds to comply with a cleanup order than their ultimate liability would justify). 
90. Environmental Protection Agency Memorandum on Cost Recovery Action 
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(August 26, 1983), reprinted in 41 ENVTL. REP. Federal Laws (BNA) 2865 (1983) (EPA 
Memorandum). 
91. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (S.D. Ohio 
1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); accord United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. 
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). 
92. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 365 n.8 (1986) (identifying the compet-
ing bills as H.R. 85, H.R. 7020 and S. 1480. The note provides a detailed description of 
the legislative process involved in integrating the three bills). 
Id. 
93. Section 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1993), states, in pertinent part: 
(14) The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any sub-
stance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 
33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or sub-
stance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) 
any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified 
under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921) (but not including any 
waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.) has been suspended by Act 
of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 
1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed 
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412), 
and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mix-
ture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action 
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. 
12
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trine to fill gaps left in the Act's statutory framework. 94 
C. THE SCOPE OF CERCLA LIABILITY 
Courts have perceived the Act as "casting an exceedingly 
broad, strict-liability net."95 Facility owners,96 prior owners,97 
successor corporations,98 corporate officers who have been in a 
94. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 
1988) ("The meager legislative history available indicates that Congress expected the 
courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the statute."), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 1029 (1989); see also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 
1390 (S.D. Ohio 1988) ("Where the statutory language and legislative history of CER-
CLA are inconclusive and the legislative history shows that the common law was in-
tended to fill such gaps, the common law is a proper source of guidance."), aff'd, 872 
F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
95. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip. 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 982 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1993). The district court stated: 
[d. at 527. 
The scope of CERCLA liability serves to encourage private re-
medial initiative as to existing sites, to discourage careless dis-
position of toxic wastes, and not least, to ensure vigilance of 
those whose proximity to generators of toxic substances cre-
ates a potential for liability, who also occupy the most advan-
tageous positions from which to monitor these entities. 
96. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
97. FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Minn. 1987); see also 
Nurad Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.) (imposing liability 
on an equitable owner who had possessed the property for a short time and never used 
the leaking underground tanks that caused the contamination problem), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 377 (1992). The court stated: 
We do not think, however, that the word "owned" is a word 
that admits of varying degrees. Such equitable considerations 
as the duration of ownership may well be relevant at a later 
stage of the proceedings when the district court allocates re-
sponse costs among the liable parties, but we reject any sug-
gestion that a short-term owner is somehow not an owner for 
purposes of [42 U.S.C. ]§ 9613(f)(I). 
[d. at 844. The Nurad court emphasized that, "[A] defendant need not have exercised 
actual control of a facility to qualify as an operator under [Section] 9607(a)(2), so long as 
the authority to control the facility was present." [d. at 840. 
98. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). Celotex acquired the interests of a company that sold 
a contaminated property to the plaintiff prior to Celotex's acquisition. Despite Celotex's 
lack of operation or control of the contaminated facility, the court determined that cor-
porate successors and survivors of corporate consolidations assume the debts and liabili-
ties of the predecessor company, including the predecessor company's CERCLA liability. 
The court stated, "[t]he costs associated with cleanup must be absorbed somewhere .... 
Congressional intent supports the conclusion that, when choosing between the taxpayers 
or a successor corporation, the successor should bear the cost." [d. at 91-92. See also 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1266, 1268-9 
13
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position to control waste disposal decisions,99 and those who 
have arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at a 
given facilitylOO have confronted CERCLA liability. Courts read-
ily impose joint and several liability when more than one poten-
tially responsible party is involved and the contaminants for 
which each is responsible have commingled or cannot be ad-
dressed adequately on an individual basis. lol 
(E.D. Va. 1992) (extending CERCLA liability to the inheritor of a sole proprietorship 
named in a suit for contribution). But see United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 
980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992) (overturning CERCLA liability imposed on a successor cor-
poration where the defendant and its predecessor were two distinct companies in compe-
tition with one another prior to the acquisition and where the predecessor failed to dis-
close the nature of its pending CERCLA liability prior to the transaction). 
In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 1046 (1991), CERCLA liability was extended to a secured creditor with imputed 
authority to control the waste management practices of the debtor. The court stated; 
[A] secured creditor may incur [42 U.S.C.] Section 9607(a)(2) 
liability, without being an operator, by participating in the fi-
nancial management of a facility to a degree indicating a ca-
pacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous 
wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor to actually 
involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in or-
der to be liable - although such conduct will certainly lead to 
the loss of the protection of the statutory exemption. Nor is it 
necessary for the secured creditor to participate in manage-
ment decisions relating to hazardous wastes. Rather, a secured 
creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management 
of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference 
that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so 
chooses. ' 
[d. at 1557-1558. Subsequent to Fleet Factors, the EPA issued a regulation (57 Fed. Reg. 
18,344 (April 29, 1992) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100) pertaining to the lender liabil-
ity exemption of CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1993) ("Owner ... does not in-
clude a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, 
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest .... "». Under the 
EPA rule, "participation in the management" generally means that the holder is actually 
participating in the management or operational affairs of the debtor and does not extend 
to the mere capacity to exert influence. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b); see also Kurt Burk-
holder, The Lender Liability Rule Under CERCLA, 7 NAT'L ENVTL, ENFORCEMENT J. 3 
(1992) (providing an in-depth discussion of the new EPA regulation). But see Kelly v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 15 F.3d 1100 (DC Cir. 1994) (finding that the EPA 
exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating a regulation purporting to define the 
scope of liability imposed by CERCLA). 
99. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 
(W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
100. See, e.g" Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Serv., Inc., 959 F.2d 126 
(9th Cir. 1992); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). 
101. See, e,g" United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990). 
14
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Commentators ascribe numerous advantages to a broad in-
terpretation of CERCLA liability.lo2 Strict liability represents 
the best means of replenishing expended Superfund monies, en-
couraging the safer handling and disposal of wastes and facilitat-
ing the internalization of waste disposal costs within the indus-
tries that have reaped the financial benefits of using 
chemicals. loa This enterprise liability rationale has been upheld 
by courts and the EPA as comporting with the legislative intent 
underlying CERCLA.lo4 
The Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) was enacted in 1986. Courts have described SARA as a 
comprehensive overhaul of CERCLA.lolI The expansion in the 
definition of "response" in Section 101(25) to include "enforce-
ment activities related thereto" was one of the amendments 
SARA incorporated into CERCLA.lo6 The interpretation of this 
provision lies at the heart of the controversy between the 
Circuits. 
D. COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA 
CERCLA provides for recovery claims by either government 
agencies or private individuals who have incurred costs cleaning 
up contaminated sites. lo7 Recoverable costs include any "not in-
102. Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1458, 1517 (1986). 
103. [d. 
104. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Ohio 1988), 
aft'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
105. See, e.g., Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.R.I. 1989). 
106. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 4 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2848-49 (1986). 
107. Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1993) states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and 
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this 
section -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance owned or operated any facility at which such haz-
ardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise ar-
ranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a trans-
porter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous 
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other 
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or 
15
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consistent with the National Contingency Plan"108 (NCP) for a 
government agency or Indian tribe claimant,109 or any necessary 
costs incurred "consistent with the NCP" for private individu-
als. llo The importance of this distinction is that a government 
claimant need only document that its expenditures were not in-
consistent with the NCplll while private parties bear the burden 
of both pleading and proving consistency with the NCP.112 De-
spite the disadvantage private parties have in bringing CERCLA 
actions relative to government claimants, the private suit provi-
sions of the Act serve to promote settlements and thereby con-
serve the resources of the Superfund which alone is inadequate 
[d. 
operated by another party or entity and containing such haz-
ardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incin-
. eration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which 
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the in-
currence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be 
liable for ... (B) any other necessary cost of response in-
curred by any other person consistent with the national con-
tingency plan . . . . 
108. Promulgated by the EPA, the National Contingency Plan (NCP) is a set of 
regulations establishing procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazard-
ous substances. The Plan is codified in 40 C.F.R. § 300; 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (July 16, 
1982). 
109. Section 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1993) ("All costs of removal or 
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe 
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan .... "). 
110. Section 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1993) ("Any other necessary 
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency 
plan .... "). Stanton Road and Key Tronic concerned cost recovery claims brought 
under the authority of this provision. 
111. EPA Memorandum, supra note 90, at 2864; Developments in the Law: Toxic 
Waste Litigation, supra note 41, at 1501. 
112. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1514 (lOth Cir. 1991). The 
court upheld the dismissal of a claim for cost recovery against a former owner of a con-
taminated landfill. The plaintiff's failure to provide an opportunity for public comment 
on the response measures taken, as required by the NCP, negated any right to cost re-
covery from the former owner. However, in dicta the court recognized the validity of an 
action seeking a declaratory right to recover future response costs, providing that such 
costs are incurred in a manner consistent VVith the NCP. [d. at 1513. But see Donahey v. 
Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 636 (1993). In Donahey, the 
Sixth Circuit found that although consistency with the NCP was a necessary element for 
the recovery of remedial costs, it would not necessarily follow that strict consistency is 
required for the recovery of monitoring or investigative costs. [d. at 1255. See also Wil-
liam B. Johnson, Application of Requirement in § 107(a) of Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 9607(a)) That Pri-
vate Cost-Recovery Actions Be Consistent With The National Contingency Plan, 107 
A.L.R. FED 563 (1992) (providing an in-depth discussion of the issue). 
16
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to address a problem of national scope.113 Hundreds of cost re-
covery actions have been filed since the Act's enactment in 
1980.114 
The elements of a CERCLA cost recovery action include: 
1) the contaminated site fits within the definition of facility 
as stated in Section 101; 
2) a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance 
has occurred at the facility; 
3) the release or threatened release caused the claimant to 
incur response costs; and \ 
4) the defendant falls within at least one of the four catego-
ries of liable persons described in Section 107(a).m 
The cost recovery provisions of CERCLA may provide a 
means of relief in states where no comparable right is available 
under state law. The California Hazardous Substance Account 
Act11S is the state equivalent of CERCLA. This law, however, 
does not provide for private cost recovery actions. ll7 
113. See United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1991) ("This 
case, even though it involves over $300,000, is but a pimple on the elephantine carcass of 
the CERCLA litigation now making its way through the court system."); MANASTER & 
SELMI, supra note 85, § 50.51(1): 
[T)he Superfund is incapable of adequately addressing even 
the presently known waste sites. The $8.5 billion [fund availa-
ble) represents less than 3 percent of the $300 billion that 
some sources estimate the cleanup of these sites will cost. 
Rather, the Superfund is designed chiefly as a standby mecha-
nism in case a site is not addressed by those parties CERCLA 
designates as liable for the cleanup. 
ld. See also Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental Contam-
ination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 34 (1987) ("Unfortunately, $8.5 billion will 
not put more than a modest dent in the contamination problem nationwide."); Develop-
ments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 41, at 1497 n.69 (emphasizing 
that government savings in private party cleanups are realized primarily through the 
reduCtion in administrative costs and the increased time value of Fund money). 
114. See 4 WILLIAM H.RODGERS. JR.. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND 
SUBSTANCES, § 8.11(A) (West 1992) ("[B)illions of dollars in cleanup costs have changed 
hands and hundreds of billions of dollars in potential liabilities are rebounding through 
the insurance system."). 
115. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989). 
116. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25395 (West 1993). 
117. DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER. STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
17
Byrne: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
594 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:577 
E. ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
The core of the dispute between the Circuits regarding the 
availability of attorneys' fees as recoverable response costs arises 
from the Act's notoriously imprecise drafting. lls CERCLA Sec-
tion 101(25)ll9 defines the terms "respond" or "response" as "re-
§ 9.02(1)(C) (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan 1991); see also Michael B. Hingerty, Property 
Owner Liability for Environmental Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 
65 (1987) ("Unlike the federal Superfund, there is no private right of action under the 
California Superfund Law. This omission has minimal practical impact on PRP's how-
ever, because the federal Superfund provides a response cost recovery right for any site 
cleaned up under the state law.") 
Hingerty's blanket statement fails to consider two significant features of the state 
law: the broader scope of materials falling within the definition of "hazardous substance" 
under the state law and that the authority of the state law can only be initiated by a 
government agency. Section 25363(e) of the state Health & Safety Code (Code) grants a 
right to persons incurring response costs to join other responsible parties or, in the alter-
native, to bring a subsequent claim for contribution against other responsible parties. 
However, the claimant's liability must arise from an abatement order issued by the state 
Department of Health Services under the authority of Section 25358.3 of the Code. 
The state act defines "hazardous substance" in Code Section 25316 which, in addi-
tion to the CERCLA definition, incorporates by reference Section 25117, the Code's defi-
nition of hazardous waste. Subsection (b) of Code Section 25117 states, "Hazardous 
waste includes, but is not limited to RCRA hazardous waste." It is therefore possible for 
liability under the state act to attach for environmental contamination not subject to 
CERCLA liability. The significance of this disparity between the state and the federal 
laws is that a potentially responsible party subject to liability only under the state act 
has no incentive to pursue a voluntary cleanup with the expectation of receiving cost 
recovery from other responsible parties. Courts have recognized the value of this mecha-
nism as furthering the goals of CERCLA. See, e.g., County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 937 
F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1991). In his paper, Hingerty makes reference to the powerful 
force CERCLA's private cost recovery provision contributes toward achieving the Act's 
purpose by encouraging private environmental cleanups. 
It is doubtful that the Environmental Protection Agency, 
with its national concerns and limited resources, would use the 
Superfund to clean up a site with only marginally hazardous 
amounts of contamination. However, a private right of action 
under CERCLA might be used to recover cleanup costs at 
more modestly contaminated sites cleaned up by private par-
ties. Private parties have frequently used the private right of 
action to recover the costs of cleaning up contaminated sites 
that did not appear on the federal priorities list. The possibil-
ity of such private actions gives practical import to the broad 
definition of CERCLA facilities, despite the unlikelihood of a 
government action at many of these facilities otherwise. 
Hingerty, supra at 46. 
118. See, e.g., HRW Sys. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 346 (E.D. 
Va. 1993) ("Once again, the language in which Congress chose to express itself in this 
area was less than precise. Once again, the Court is forced to attempt to interpret the 
statute with little more than the dowsing-rod of legislative intent."). 
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1993). 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss3/5
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 595 
m.ove, rem.oval, remedy and remedial acti.on; all such terms (in-
cluding the terms 'rem.oval' and 'remedial acti.on') include 
enf.orcement activities related theret.o. "120 The statute pr.ovides 
detailed descriptive definiti.ons .of the terms "rem.ove" .or "re-
m.oval"121 and "remedy" .or remedial acti.on,"122 but d.oes n.ot de-
fine the term "enf.orcement activities."123 
In General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation 
Systems,12" the Eighth Circuit c.oncluded that a private-party 
c.ost rec.overy claim under CERCLA c.onstituted an enf.orcement 
activity and att.orneys' fees incurred were rec.overable as "neces-
sary c.osts .of resp.onse."1211 The c.ourt relied .on the definiti.on .of 
Secti.on 101(25) t.o c.onclude that .ordinary rules .of statut.ory c.on-
structi.on w.ould be "strained t.o the breaking p.oint" if enf.orce-
ment activities, as reflected in legal c.osts incurred by private 
parties, were excluded fr.om the sc.ope .of rec.overable c.osts au-
th.orized by Secti.on 107(a)(4)(B).126 Theref.ore, the Litton c.ourt 
determined that the American Rule had been sufficiently satis-
fied. 127 The Eighth Circuit buttressed its c.onclusi.on with an ex-
tensive discussi.on .of the public p.olicy g.oals underlying CER-
CLA and emphasized that the Litton h.olding was necessary t.o 
further these g.oals.128 
120. [d. 
121. Section 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1993). 
122. Section 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1993). 
123. Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 943, 945 (W.D.N.Y. 
1992) ("CERCLA does not define the term 'enforcement activities,' and contrary to the 
argument of the plaintiff, this Court does not believe that the term has a 'plain and 
ordinary meaning.' Therefore, the term must be examined in its statutory context and in 
light of its legislative history."). 
[d. 
124. 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991). 
125. [d. at 1422. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. 
128. The court stated: 
This conclusion, based on the statutory language is consistent 
with two of the main purposes of CERCLA - prompt cleanup 
of hazardous waste sites and imposition of all cleanup costs on 
the responsible party. These purposes would be undermined if 
a non-polluter (such as GE) were forced to absorb the litiga-
tion costs of recovering its response costS from the polluter. 
The litigation costs could easily approach or even exceed the 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
596 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:577 
Courts siding with the Eighth Circuit contend ~hat (1) the 
wording of Section 107(a)(4)(B) is sufficiently precise and ex-
plicit to satisfy the American Rule,129 and (2) that to preclude 
the recovery of litigation costs frustrates CERCLA's policy goal 
of encouraging private voluntary cleanups. ISO Legal costs, the 
Eighth Circuit and its allies argue, are inherent in any pursuit of 
CERCLA response costs. lSI Precluding the recovery of these 
costs provides private parties a disincentive to voluntarily clean 
up contamination if other PRP's may be available. ls2 This policy 
goal argument predominates the analysis of courts in the Eighth 
Circuit's camp. ISS 
129. See, e.g., Hastings Bldg. Prod. v. National Aluminum Corp., 815 F. Supp. 228, 
232 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. v. Peck Iron & Metal, 814 F. 
Supp. 1281, 1283 (E.D. Va. 1993); Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. 
Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1990). The Pease & Curren court stated: 
Id. at 951. 
In ascertaining the plain meaning of "enforcement activities," 
this Court concludes that Congress intended for enforcement 
activities to include attorney's fees expended to induce a re-
sponsible party to comply with remedial actions mandated by 
CERCLA. This court cannot ascertain any other logical inter-
pretation which would give effect to this phrase. If this Court 
were to rule otherwise, the phrase "enforcement activities" 
would be superfluous. 
130. See, e.g., HRW Sys. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318 (D. Md. 
1993). The court stated: 
Id. at 346. 
131. [d. 
[E]nvironmental litigation is an extremely expensive business 
. . . Both private individuals and corporate entities would 
have to be able to devote significant resources to attorney's 
fees, were these not be to available as necessary response 
costs. 
This conclusion leads inevitably to the conclusion that the 
absence of attorney's fees as a recoverable cost of response will 
act as a huge and, in many cases, insurmountable, obstacle to 
those seeking to bring private recovery actions under CER-
CLA. This in turn would frustrate the purpose of the statute 
in allowing, and in fact encouraging, such actions, and instead 
throw the lion's share of enforcement actions on the finan-
cially stooped shoulders of the Government. This was seem-
ingly the precise result which the institution of the private re-
covery action under CERCLA was intended to avoid. 
132. Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991) ("The court 
can conceive of no surer method to defeat [CERCLA's] purpose [of encouraging parties 
to expend their own funds immediately without waiting for other responsible parties to 
take action] than to require private parties to shoulder the financial burden of the very 
litigation that is necessary to recover these costs."). 
133. See generally Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
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Courts mustering under the Ninth Circuit's banner on this 
issue concede the logic of Litton, as it relates to furthering CER-
CLA's underlying policy goals, but disagree vehemently that the 
language of Section 107 (a)(4)(B) is sufficient to satisfy the 
American Rule. 134 Furthermore, courts in this camp point to the 
guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Alyeska and Run-
yon to argue that the policy goals of CERCLA are an invalid 
basis on which to weigh the appropriateness of awarding attor-
neys' fees. l31i 
In addition, courts rejecting the Litton rationale frequently 
cite the legislative history of the Superfund Amendment and 
Reauthorization Act (SARA) as authority negating any congres-
sional intent that priva:te parties be allowed to recover attorneys' 
fees. ls6 Section 101(25)'s reference to "enforcement activities re-
115 S. Ct. 636 (1993); Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 710. 
134. See, e.g., Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 943, 946 
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Even if private party cost recovery suits could be characterized as 
'enforcement actions' under CERCLA, the statutory language would still fall far short of 
'explicit congressional authorization' for attorney fees."); Santa Fe Pac. Realty Corp. v. 
United States, 780 F. Supp. 687, 695 (E.D. Cal. 1991) ("[T]he phrase 'enforcement activi-
ties related thereto' falls short of an explicit award of attorneys' fees. When Congress 
intended to provide for an award of attorneys' fees in other circumstances under CER-
CLA, it did so explicitly."). 
135. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993) where the 
court stated: 
We recognize that CERCLA is designed to encourage private 
parties to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup by al-
lowing them to seek recovery from others. It may be true that 
awarding the litigation fees incurred would further this goal. 
Nonetheless, the efficacy of an exception to the American rule 
is a policy decision that must be made by Congress, not the 
courts. The desirability of a fee-shifting provision cannot sub-
stitute for the express authorization mandated by the Su-
preme Court. 
[d. at 847. See also Santa Fe Pac. Realty, 780 F. Supp. at 696, where the court stated: 
It is not for this court to impose a fee shifting provision sim-
ply because it may be consistent with the statutory scheme or 
purpose of CERCLA. 
The court cannot compensate for a decisive lack of explic-
itness in the statute by importing its informed opinion of what 
measures would best achieve the purposes of CERCLA [cita-
tion omitted]. The "generalized commands" of the statute 
provide an insufficient basis for concluding that Congress in-
tended attorneys' fees to be recoverable as response costs by a 
private party. 
[d. (citing Runyon, 427 U.S. at 186). 
136. Santa Fe Pac. Realty, 780 F. Supp. at 695; Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 
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lated thereto" was incorporated into CERCLA by the enactment 
of SARA.lS7 The legislative history of the provision states that 
the amendment "will confirm the EPA's authority to recover 
costs for enforcement actions taken against responsible par-
ties."ls8 SARA, the Litton opponents emphasize, was a compre-
hensive overhaul of CERCLA.lS9 The argument continues, had 
Congress intended to include attorneys' fees among response 
costs available to private-party claimants, Section 107 could 
have been easily amended to reflect that fact.140 
Courts holding that the American Rule precludes the award 
of attorneys' fees for private-party cost recovery claims find the 
absence of an explicit authorization for such an award "conspic-
UOUS."141 CERCLA's government cost recovery provision,142 
whistle-blower employee protection provision,14S and the provi-
sion authorizing citizen suitslU to compel the government to en-
766 F. Supp. 335, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
137. Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 
(W.D.N.Y. 1992). 
138. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 4 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2848-49 (1986); see also T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. 
Supp. 696, 708 n.13 (D. N.J. 1988) (arguing that private parties do not incur "enforce-
ment costs as contemplated by CERCLA" because they cannot bring an action to en-
force CERCLA's cleanup provisions against another private entity). 
139. Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.R.I. 1989). 
140. Id.; Fallowfield, 766 F. Supp. at 338; see also, Santa Fe Pac. Realty, 780 F. 
Supp. at 695 ("Instead, Congress chose to insert a phrase outside even the most exhaus-
tive lexicon of customary fee shifting language."). 
141. Abbot Labs. V. Thermo Chern., Inc., 790 F. Supp. 135, 142 (W.D. Mich. 1991). 
142. Section 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1993), states in pertinent part: "[the Pres-
ident] may undertake such ... legal ... and other studies and investigations as he may 
deem necessary or appropriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover costs 
thereof, and to enforce provisions of this chapter." 
Id. 
143. Section 1l0(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9610(c) (1993) states: 
Whenever an order is issued under this section to abate such 
violation, at the request of the applicant a sum equal to the 
aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including the at-
torney's fees) determined by the Secretary of Labor to have 
been reasonably incurred by the applicant for, or in connec-
tion with, the institution and prosecution of such proceedings, 
shall be assessed against the person committing such violation. 
144. Section 310(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1993), states in pertinent part: "[t]he court, 
in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs 
of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or 
substantially prevailing party whenever the court determines such an award is appropri-
ate."). See Regan V. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 148-50 (D.R.1. 1989) (distinguishing 
the remedies available to a citizen suit petitioner as opposed to a § 107(a)(4)(B) private-
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force the statute all contain explicit fee shifting language. Rule 
adherents cite these provisions to illustrate that Congress is ca-
pable of drafting an explicit attorneys' fees recovery provision 
for CERCLA if desired. I'll Finally, some courts championing the 
Rule's prominence deny that a private-party cost recovery action 
can be considered an "enforcement activity" as contemplated by 
CERCLA.I46 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY VIEWPOINT 
1. Stanton Road Assoc. v. Lohrey Enterprises 
In Stanton Road Assoc. u. Lohrey Enterprises,I47 the major-
ity began its analysis by taking note of the split in authority 
among district courts within the Circuit on the matter of 
whether the attorneys' fees of private litigants constituted CER-
CLA response costs. HS The discussion then expanded to encom-
pass the dispute among courts nationwide. I49 Clearly, the court 
concluded, the presence of such disharmony among the nation's 
courts illustrated that an integration of the language of Sections 
101(25) and 107(a)(4)(B) was inadequate to satisfy the American 
Rule. Illo Furthermore, though conceding that a review of a stat-
party cost recovery claimant). 
145. See, e.g., In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 934 (lst Cir. 1993); 
Alloy Briquetting, 802 F. Supp. at 947. 
146. See, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990) 
(emphasizing that private-party cost recovery claimants cannot bring an action to en-
force CERCLA's cleanup provisions against another private party), aft'd, 982 F.2d 1436 
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993); accord T & E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 
708 n.13. 
147. 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993). 
148. Id. at 1018, comparing Pease & Curren Ref. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 
945, 952 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (allowing recovery) with Santa Fe Pac. Realty Corp. v. United 
States, 780 F. Supp. 687, 695 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (prohibiting recovery). 
Id. 
149. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019. 
150. The court stated: 
[T)he fact that those district courts that have confronted this 
issue disagree on the question of whether attorneys' fees are 
allowable under section [sic) 101(25) and 107(a)(4)(B) demon-
strates that the words "enforcement activities" do not explic-
itly signal, with any persuasive degree of clarity, that Congress 
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ute's legislative history was in order when the language of a stat-
ute seemed ambiguous, the majority found such a review inap-
propriate in regards to the issue of attorneys' fees. lIH The clear 
guidance of the Supreme Court in Alyeska and Runyon pre-
cluded such an examination.1I12 
The majority found the terms "necessary cost of response" 
in Section 107(a)(4)(B) failed to "expressly authorize an award 
of attorneys' fees for legal expenses incurred in remediating the 
contamination of property."1IIS The court criticized the Eighth 
Circuit's analysis in Litton for emphasizing the Act's public pol-
icy goals as "misplaced" and defiant of Supreme Court 
direction. lli4 
The majority rejected the district court's escrow account 
cleanup fund remedy on two grounds; (1) Ninth Circuit prece-
dence required that a plaintiff must actually incur response 
costs before recovery is permissible,lIiIi and (2) allowing such an 
award relieved Stanton Road of its burden of proving in an ad-
versarial proceeding that incurred expenditures were necessary 
and consistent with the NCP .11i6 
Finally, the majority pointed to the Act's savings clauselli7 
to conclude that CERCLA did not preempt state law. lli8 There-




153. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019. 
154. [d. 
155. Dant & Russell v. Burlington N. R.R., 951 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1991). 
156. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1021. 
157. Section 302(d); 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1993), states: 
Nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the 
obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or 
State law, including common law, with respect to releases of 
hazardous substances or other pollutants or contaminants. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not be considered, inter-
preted, or construed in any way as reflecting a determination, 
in part or whole, of policy regarding the inapplicability of 
strict liability, or strict liability doctrines, to activities relating 
to hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants or other 
such activities. 
158. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1021. 
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state law remedies, but ordered the matter remanded.11l9 The 
majority found fault in the fact that the district court failed to 
distinguish the extent to which its monetary damage award 
arose from permissible state law, as opposed to CERCLA.160 The 
Ninth Circuit required clarification on this point. 
2. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States 
In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States l61 the majority solidi-
fied its Stanton Road holding on the matter of attorneys' fees, 
declaring that the American Rule's fee shifting prohibition en-
compassed all legal costs derived by private-party cost recovery 
claimants.162 In this regard, the Ninth Circuit's analysis diverged 
from that of other courts which, though agreeing that the Rule 
precluded an award of litigation costs, have nevertheless ex-
pressed a willingness to entertain awarding attorneys' fees de-
rived from non-litigation activities related to a private-party 
CERCLA cost recovery claim.16s 
B. JUDGE CANBY'S DISSENT 
Judge Canby's dissenting opmlOn arose from the premise 
that CERCLA is "a machine driven by private litigation, or the 
threat of it."164 The judge differentiated between enforcement as 
opposed to cleanup costs, and stressed tha~ the lion's share of a 
private party's enforcement costs consists of attorneys' fees. 1611 
"Congress," the judge exclaimed, "cannot have been ignorant of 
159. [d. 
160. [d. 
161. 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 633 (1993). 
162. [d. at 1027·82. 
163. FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d 842, 847·48 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding the 
American Rule applied only to actual litigation costs, not all legal expenses incurred in 
negotiating contracts and agreements associated with a CERCLA response action); 
United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1516 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (allowing the recov· 
ery of attorneys' fees derived in entering access agreements with adjacent landowners in 
order to undertake remedial measures and investigate conditions as necessary costs of 
the response under § 107(a)(4){B)), afT'd, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 300 (1993); International Clinical Labs., Inc. v. Stevens, 30 ENvTL. REP. CASES 
(BNA) 2066, 2069 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (awarding $19,425 in attorneys' fees incurred negoti· 
ating a consent decree with a state environmental regulatory agency in a private· party 
CERCLA cost recovery claim). 
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that fact."166 Absent a recovery of legal fees, the argument con-
tinued, a private party's statutory right to recover enforcement 
costs was meaningless. Judge Canby concluded that the lan-
guage of Sections 101(25) and 107(a)(4)(B) must be interpreted 
as granting a right to recover attorneys' fees if the provisions 
were to have any effect.167 Congress inserted Section 101(25)'s 
expanded definition of "response" into the Act for some pur-
pose, the judge pointed out, and to impose an interpretation 
consistent with the pre-SARA wording of the provision defied 
any logical construction of the statute.16S 
Judge Canby placed little weight on the fact that CERCLA 
contains more explicit grants of authority for awarding attor-
neys' fees than those relied upon by the Eighth Circuit.169 "Con-
gress," the judge explained, "is not confined to a particular lin-
guistic formula; it need only manifest its clear intention to 
permit the litigant to recover fees."17o As far as Judge Canby was 
concerned, the 1986 amendments to CERCLA did precisely that. 
Judge Canby also criticized the majority's restrictive view of 
the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Alyeska and 
Runyon. l7l The judge argued that the rule articulated in these 
cases applied only when Congress has not indicated its intent on 
the matter of fee shifting.172 In conclusion, the judge faulted the 
majority for: (1) recognizing a presumption against the award of 
fees, and thereby imposing a linguistic burden upon Congress; 




168. The judge stated: 
Had this case arisen between 1980 and 1986,then, Stanton 
Road would have been entitled to recover its "costs of reme-
dial action." Those recoverable costs might reasonably have 
been interpreted to be only those incurred in the physical 
cleanup of a site. 
In 1986, however, Congress ... amended section 101(25) 
of CERCLA to. . . include enforcement activities . . . In the 
scheme of CERCLA, this language must mean that private 
plaintiffs can recover attorneys' fees expended in enforcing the 
liabilities that CERCLA enforces on polluters. 
169. [d. at 1023-24. 
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and (3) creating an unnecessary conflict among the Circuits.17s 
Though expressing comfort with the district court's escrow 
cleanup fund account,174 Judge Canby's dissent focused primar-
ily on procedural aspects of the matter. The judge emphasized 
that the defendant had raised no objection to the arrangement 
at the trial court. Had the defendant done so, the judge pointed 
out, an arrangement satisfactory to the majority's strict con-
struction of the Act may have been possible. m Furthermore, 
Judge Canby concluded, because of Lohrey's acquiescence, the 
matter was not sufficiently briefed and argued before the 
court. 178 
Judge Canby expended few words in his dissent in Key 
Tronic. Because of the majority's finding that attorneys' fees in 
private-party CERCLA cost recovery actions were not recover- . 
able, a conclusion which the judge criticized at length in Stan-
ton Road, he declined to pursue the matter further in Key 
Tronic. 177 
V. CRITIQUE 
In light of the Stanton Road and Key Tronic holdings, it is 
counterproductive for a responsible party to initiate a voluntary 
cleanup. At least, a party doing so can not expect to recover all 
the cleanup costs from other responsible parties. Any costs re-
covered will be offset by the amount of legal expenses incurred 
in the pursuit of the recovery claim. A better approach is to wait 
until the EPA mandates some cleanup action/78 at which time 
contribution claims can be brought against other responsible 
173. [d. 
174. [d. at 1025 ("I would not hastily rule out the use of such a tool unless I were 
convinced that the statute forbade it."). 
175. [d. 
176. [d. ("The issue, I submit, should have been left for a later day, when the par-
ties have properly framed it."). 
177. Key Tronic, 984 F.2d at 1028. 
178. CERCLA Section 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) authorizes the President to se-
cure such relief as may be necessary to abate any imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the public health or welfare of the environment due to an actual or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance from a regulated facility. Fines of up to $25,000 per day 
may be levied for failing to comply with any order issued under the authority of this 
Section. 'CERCLA § 106(b)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1993). 
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parties.17D As an added bonus, investigative costs of the contri-
bution claims can be reduced by use of the discovery process to 
identify other responsible parties through EPA records. This 
strategy also raises the possibility of contribution claims against 
oneself being precluded as a result of any accord reached with 
the EPA.180 No such advantage is available to a party initiating 
a voluntary cleanup. 
In addition to a claim for contribution, one in the position 
of the plaintiffs in Stanton Road or Key Tronic can bring citi-
zen suits against other responsible parties,181 or against the EPA 
to compel a vigorous enforcement of CERCLA against contribu-
tion claim defendants.182 The citizen suit provision of CERCLA 
explicitly grants authority for an award of attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party.183 If properly structured and pursued, the citi-
zen suit may provide a means of recovering many of the legal 
costs associated with the contribution claim. At a minimum, the 
added pressure of the EPA's involvement would likely facilitate 
settlement with contribution claim defendants. 
The majority of sites for which CERCLA liability attaches 
are not sufficiently contaminated to warrant priority treatment 
from the EP A.·184 Therefore, federal cleanup orders will be is-
sued for relatively few of the known contaminated sites in the 
United States. For this reason, the Ninth Circuit's determina-
179. CERCLA Section 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1993) provides in pertinent 
part: "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or poten-
tially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under 
section 9606 or under section 9607(a) of this title." 
180. CERCLA Section 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1993), states in part: "[a] 
person who has resolved its liability to the United States ... in an administrative or 
judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding 
matters addressed in the settlement." Section 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) 
(1993), specifiies that a party to such a settlement with the United States is not pre-
cluded from pursuing contribution claims against other responsible parties who are not a 
party to the settlement. 
181. CERCLA Section 310(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (1993), states in pertinent 
part: "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf - (1) against any 
person. . . who is alleged to be in violation of any standard, condition, requirement, or 
order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter." 
182. CERCLA Section 31O(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2) (1993), states in pertinent 
part: "any person may commence a civil aciton on his own behalf - (2) against the 
President or any other officer of the United States ... where there is alleged a failure 
... to perform any act or duty under this chapter ... which is not discretionary .... " 
183. See supra note 144. 
184. See Hingerty, supra note 117. 
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tions in Stanton Road and Key Tronic run counter to the pur-
poses of CERCLA in that delay in cleanup actions is virtually 
certain to result. Nevertheless, the clear guidance of the Su-
preme Court in Alyeska and Runyon provides a stable founda-
tion on which the Ninth Circuit can rest its holdings. The deci-
sions of ,the Ninth Circuit comport more closely with the 
rationale of the Supreme Court than do the conclusions of the 
Eighth Circuit in Litton and its progeny. Despite that fact, the 
Court may find fault with the Ninth Circuit's analysis. 
In FMC, l8Ii the Tenth Circuit articulated a less draconian 
position on the issue of awarding attorneys' fees. The Tenth Cir-
cuit differentiated between legal costs derived from litigation as 
opposed to non-litigation activities associated with a cost recov-
ery claim.18B By this means, the Tenth Circuit comported with 
Supreme Court precedence with minimal frustration of the pol-
icy goals underlying CERCLA. Support for this approach may 
be found in the Court's use of the terms "burdens of litigation" 
in Alyeska187 and "costs of litigation" in Runyon. 188 Further-
more, other courts have concluded that some legal expenditures 
are "necessary costs," and hence recoverable costs, of a CER-
CLA response action. 189 The language of Section l07(a)(4)(B) 
may prove sufficiently explicit to allow the recovery of these 
185. FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993). 
186. The FMC court stated: 
[Nonlitigation attorneys fees) do not fall under the American 
rule set out in Alyeska and Runyon because they are not in-
curred in pursuing litigation. Accordingly, recovery of these 
fees is not barred as a matter of law. Rather, the issue is 
whether non litigation attorneys fees are necessary response 
costs within the meaning of section 9607(a)(4)(8) .... Plain-
tiffs seek recovery of the non litigation attorneys fees generated 
in designing and negotiating the removal action and in prepar-
ing and carrying out the w()rk plan approved by the EPA. For 
example, plaintiffs submitted affidavits . . . evidencing fees 
paid for negotiating and drafting contracts with environmental 
professionals who performed the removal work, negotiating 
changes to the work plan, and monitoring progress. We cannot 
say as a matter of law that, under the circumstances here, 
none of these nonlitigation attorneys fees were necessary re-
sponse costs. 
[d. at 847-48. 
187. 421 U.S. at 247. 
188. 427 U.S. at 185. 
189. See, e,g., HRW Sys. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 346 (D. 
Md. 1993); Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991). 
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costs. Fault may arise in the Ninth Circuit's applying too strin-
gent a standard in assessing the American Rule, imposing a 
hyper-technical interpretation at the expense of frustrating the 
Act's underlying congressional purpose. This was the gist of 
Judge Canby's dissent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
CERCLA's imprecise drafting has antagonized courts since 
its enactment in 1980. Congress' overhaul of the Act, by means 
of SARA, added little clarity to the law.190 Traditionally, courts 
applied a liberal construction to the Act's' terms, guided by a 
desire to further CERCLA's underlying remedial purpose.l9l 
However, in Stanton Road and Key Tronic, the Ninth Circuit 
wrestled with competing focal points of judicial policy; further-
ing CERCLA's preference that private parties initiate voluntary 
cleanup actions thereby avoiding the expenditure of public 
funds, or strict adherence to the American Rule prohibiting the 
award of attorneys' fees absent explicit statutory authority. The 
majority concluded that, between the competing policy objec-
tives, the American Rule took absolute precedence. 
In any event, CERCLA is scheduled for reauthorization in 
1994. Should the Ninth Circuit's holding or the pending Su-
preme Court assessment of the matter reach a conclusion that 
does not reflect the intent of Congress, a solution is readily ap-
parent. Congress need only amend section 107(a)(4)(B) to ex-
pressly grant private-party cost recovery claimants a right to re-
cover attorneys' fees in clear, unambiguous language. 
Dennis J. Byrne* 
190. See supra note 72. 
191. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 
1081 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 
(S.D. Ohio 1988), aft'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Reilly Tar & 
Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. 
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